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Paul Szasz 
OVER THE YEARS, THE EXERCISE OF MILITARY FORCE to accomplish national or international objectives has become ever less 
acceptable and, in many instances, legally or politically objectionable. 
Consequently, the alternative of relying on economic sanctions has become 
more attractive. Indeed, the current decade has seen more instances of 
internationally organized economic boycotts than has probably all of recorded 
history, while at the same time individual national exercises of systematic 
economic pressures have also increased. 
As a result, there are by now sufficient instances in which economic 
sanctions have been, and in some instances are still being, implemented that 
some tentative conclusions concerning their effectiveness can be drawn and 
the many legal problems that have, sometimes unexpectedly, arisen can be 
examined. This study will concentrate on the latter, while questions 
concerning effectiveness will be considered only in the context of whether a 
low degree of effectiveness may be relevant to the legality of particular 
measures and oflegal and administrative steps that might be taken to increase 
effectiveness. 
"Economic sanctions" will be dealt with in a broad sense-that is, all means 
of exercising pressures short of the threat or use of military force directly 
against a target State or entity. Thus, aside from strictly economic measures, 
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pressures exercised through breaking or reducing diplomatic, cultural, or 
communication ties will be considered. 
The purpose of the pressures to be considered here must be to induce 
compliance with some international obligation that the target State has failed 
to observe. Collective sanctions for essentially punitive purposes have no 
accepted place in international law, and the question of the legality of 
individual national reprisal, retorsion, or retaliation will not be considered 
here. Nor will this study address the question of the legality of applying 
economic pressure as part of diplomatic bargaining. The pressures that will be 
examined range from a mere refusal to trade or to maintain certain economic, 
cultural, or diplomatic relations, to pressures on others to do likewise 
(secondary boycotts), as well as the use offorce to prevent trading between the 
target State and third parties. 
The Right to Impose Economic Sanctions 
Rights of Individual States. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter 
prohibits all UN members from resorting to the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (i.e., UN member 
or not). Though the point was not explicitly stated, the word "force" in this 
context was at least initially generally understood to refer only to military 
force.1 It is, however, necessary to examine whether this restricted meaning 
still prevails or whether some additional grounds have been developed for 
proscribing the exercise of other types of pressures by UN members against the 
political independence of any State. 
Over the years, various international organs, and particularly the UN 
General Assembly, have adopted a series of solemn resolutions that, inter alia, 
are designed to delegitimize the use of economic force by individual States. 
One of the first of these was the 1965 "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty," which declared that 
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or other types or 
measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of 
the exercise of its sovereign rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind.2 
Precisely the same text was repeated in the 1970 "Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among 
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,"3 which is 
widely accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the UN Charter. A similar 
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text appears in the 1980 "Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States."4 
In 1995 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on "Economic Measures 
as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing 
Countries."s In it the Assembly expressed grave concern "that the use of 
coercive economic measures adversely affects the economy and development 
efforts of developing countries and has a general negative impact on 
international economic cooperation" and urged 
the international community to adopt urgent and effective measures to 
eliminate the use by some developed countries of unilateral coercive measures 
against developing countries which are not authorized by relevant organs of the 
United Nations or are inconsistent with the principles contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations, as a means of forcibly imposing the will of one 
State on another. 
In 1996 the General Assembly adopted a further resolution to similar effect, 
under the title "Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures as a Means of 
Political and Economic Compulsion.,,6 In 1997 it adopted by near unanimity a 
resolution on "Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and 
Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries"-in which it largely 
repeated the 1995 language but added contravention of "the basic principles of 
the multilateral trading system" as an additional ground for eliminating "the 
use of unilateral coercive economic measures against developing 
countries"-as well as an even stronger though more limited resolution on 
"Human Rights and Unilateral Coercive Measures.,,7 
Consequent on the 1995 resolution, the UN Secretariat in the summer of 
1997 convened an ad hoc expert group meeting on "economic measures as a 
means of political and economic coercion against developing countries."s That 
group concluded, under the heading of "basic legal norms," that 
the basic principles ofinternationallaw ... as set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations, elaborated in a number of international legal instruments and backed 
by declarations adopted by international conferences, proscribe . . . the 
imposition of coercive economic measures as instruments of intervention in 
matters that are essentially Within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.9 
The allowable exceptions the group recognized from this general prohibition 
include: multilateral economic sanctions mandated by the Security Council (to 
which most of the balance of this study is devoted); other situations where the 
Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach 
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of the peace, or act of aggression; where the Security Council has merely 
recommended economic sanctions, provided that any limits specified by the 
Council are observed; where the General Assembly recommends sanctions by 
consensus or by large majorities over a period of time; certain instances where 
regional organizations impose economic sanctions for cause against their own 
members; where one or more States adopt unilateral measures in response to a 
clear violation of universally accepted norms, standards, or obligations, 
provided these States are not seeking advantages for themselves but are 
pursuing an international community interest; and where the economic 
measures constitute proportional countermeasures by a State for a prior injury, 
provided inter alia that the measures are not designed to endanger the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the target State.10 
In this connection it should be noted that the international community, as 
represented by the UN General Assembly, has in the past several years and by 
increasing majorities (in 1997, by 143 in favor and three against) adopted 
ever,stronger resolutions of condemnation of the economic sanctions imposed 
by the United States against Cuba. l1 
It may thus be concluded that, as the twentieth century reaches its close, at 
least de lege ferenda no State may any longer claim a general legal right to impose 
economic sanctions against other States, except perhaps in situations where the 
coercion is exercised in the interest of the international community and the 
latter supports or at least does not strongly oppose the measures in question. 
Role of International Organizations. Generally speaking, intergovernmental 
organization (IGOs) cannot take any steps vis,a,vis third parties that would 
not be within the authority of their members. However, if an organization 
exercises coercive measures against one of its members and in accordance with 
its constitution, then it may be said that that State has consented to such 
exercise by becoming a member of the organization and a party to its 
constituent treaty. 
Even so, if the IGO in question is a "regional arrangement or agency" within 
the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, then it may be bound by the 
requirement in Charter Article 53 (1) that any enforcement action taken by a 
regional IGO requires the authorization of the Security Council. It should, 
however, be noted that in actual practice such IGOs {including the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and various regional African 
organizations, such as The Economic Council of West African States 
(ECOW AS», have sometimes failed to secure such authorization, at least in 
advance, and the Council has not actually condemned them for that. 
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Aside from regional organizations, there are other IOOs whose charters 
allow them to impose economic penalties on members under certain 
circumstances. These IOOs include the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
which is authorized to impose certain nuclear sanctions on States that violate 
its safeguards-though for serious penalties it must tum to the Security 
Council.12 Other treaties, such as the Montreal Ozone Protocop3 and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention,14 do establish IOOs, but the restrictions they 
impose that prohibit members from trading with non,cooperating nonmembers 
or with members in violation of certain treaty provisions, in materials covered 
by the respective treaties, do not generally involve these IOOs in sanctions 
decisions; rather these provisions are designed not so much to be coercive or 
punitive but to allow the undisturbed functioning of the regimes established by 
the treaties without giving an undue advantage to States not participating in 
them. They will not be explored further here. 
The Obligation to Participate in International Economic Sanctions 
In contrast to the general prohibition against States imposing unilateral 
economic sanctions against other States, when economic sanctions are 
decreed by the UN Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, all members (except any that might be exempted pursuant to 
Charter Article 48(1)) of the Organization are required to participate in such 
collective measures. This obligation flows from Articles 2(5), 25, and 48(1) of 
the UN Charter, by which all members are bound. As for nonmembers, Article 
2(6) foresees that these too shall be required to cooperate, and in practice the 
few nonmembers (notably Switzerland) have done so voluntarily. While other 
IOOs cannot be commanded directly by the United Nations (though at least 
the "specialized agencies" and certain others have undertaken through 
relationship agreements to give serious consideration to UN 
recommendations), their members are required by Charter Article 48(2) to 
ensure their cooperation. Finally, private persons (natural or juridical), as well 
as NO Os (which are established and operate under some nation's law), must be 
required by their respective countries to conform to sanctions imposed by the 
Security Council. 
It should be noted that the Charter generally allows no exception or excuse 
for noncooperation with sanctions-except that the Security Council can 
(though it only most exceptionally does15) in effect exempt one or more 
member States under Article 48(1). However, unless the Council does so, a 
State cannot raise the argument that compliance with a particular measure 
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ordered by the Council would violate a prior treaty or contractual 
obligation-for under Charter Article 103 a member's obligations under the 
Charter must prevail over those under any other international agreement.16 
Although Article 50 of the Charter recognizes that States may, as a result of 
carrying out sanctions measures ordered by the Security Council, find 
themselves confronted with special economic problems, such problems do not 
permit these States to exempt themselves from compliance but only afford 
them the right to consult with the Council regarding a solution to these 
problems.17 
Finally, the question could be raised-though so far this has never formally 
been done-of whether a UN member could refuse to participate in the 
imposition of sanctions on the ground that these violated some higher norm, 
such as binding provisions of humanitarian law (a question that has been 
raised with respect to Iraq and will be examined below) or perhaps the 
"inherent right of referred to in Charter Article 51 (a question 
that was raised with respect to Bosnia). It should be noted that there is no 
provision for definitively settling a dispute between the Organization or one 
of its organs and a member State. From the UN's point of view, it would 
necessarily have to insist that determinations of the Security Council are 
binding and that members have obligated themselves to comply with them. 
The Councilor the General Assembly could request an advisory opinion of 
the International Court ofJustice, either on that issue of principle or on the 
legitimacy of a particular Security Council action, but the Court's opinion 
would not be binding unless the State(s) concerned had agreed to accept it as 
such. 
The Imposition of Mandatory Economic Sanctions18 
The authority of the UN Security Council to impose mandatory economic 
sanctions constitutes part of a regime for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, set out in some detail in the Charter, which in tum is based 
on a considerably less detailed provision of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. Article 16(1) of that instrument provided that if any League member 
resorted to war against another member, all other members were immediately 
and automatically to subject the former to a severance of all trade and financial 
relations, prohibit all intercourse with its nationals and prevent all financial, 
commercial, or personal intercourse between them and the nationals of the 
offending State.19 
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Formal Requirements. Under the UN Charter, the imposition of economic 
sanctions is by no means automatic, but is part of a graduated scheme set out in 
Chapter VII that remains at all times under the control of the Security Council. 
The first step must be a determination by the Security Council under Article 39 
of "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression.,,2o Although in many instances (e.g., Iraq's invasion of Kuwait) the 
validity of such a determination is not in doubt, in others (such as the 
disintegration of the Somali government) the determination appears to have 
been made solely for the, arguably laudable, purpose of allowing humanitarian 
intervention in a country needing such assistance but not having any 
government in a position to request it.21 On the other hand, the determination 
by the Council that the refusal of Libya to extradite two of its citizens to 
Scotland or the United States for trial in the Lockerbie case constituted a 
threat to or breach of the peace22 appears to have been merely a device to 
enable three permanent members of the Council to reinforce their political 
demands by the imposition of worldwide economic sanctions.23 Such 
determinations have raised the cry, in both academic and in some diplomatic 
circles, that the Council is exceeding its authority and that there appears to be 
no mechanism for preventing actual or possible abuses thereof. 
Having made a determination under Article 39, the Council may at the 
same time, pursuant to that article and Article 40, "call upon the parties 
concerned to comply with such prOvisional measures as it deems necessary or 
desirable." If it does so, the Council is to take account of any failure to comply 
with such recommended measures. 
Whether or not any provisional measures have been called for or 
complied with, the Council may, under Article 41, decide what measures 
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call on UN members to apply such measures. Unless 
otherwise clearly specified (e.g., that the Council is merely making a 
recommendation or that it is not addressing itself to all members), such a 
call is binding on all members. These measures "may include complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations." As will be pointed out below, the Council can 
adjust these measures from time to time. It can also impose certain measures 
not explicitly listed in the Charter catalogue. 
Should the Council consider that measures short of force are likely to be 
inadequate or have proven to be so, the Council may under Article 42 move 
to take military actions. These will not be examined in this study and are 
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mentioned here only to illustrate that economic sanctions do not stand alone 
but are part of a panoply of measures that the Council can deploy when faced 
with threats to or breaches of the peace, or with acts of aggression. It should be 
noted that the Council has considerable flexibility in doing so and is not bound 
(except for making the initial determination under Article 39) as to the 
sequence of the measures it may take. Nor is it required to restrict itself to one 
or the other at a time; however, before moving to military measures, it must 
make a determination that economic ones are not adequate to accomplish 
their purpose. 
In connection with the imposition of economic (or for that matter, military) 
sanctions, the Charter does not require that the Council give a formal warning 
to the target State. However, the General Assembly has recently 
recommended to the Council that a warning in unequivocal language should 
be given.24 
All decisions of the Council under Chapter VII-indeed all its substantive 
decisions-require the affirmative vote of at least nine (of the fifteen) members 
of the Council, "including the concurring votes of the [five] permanent 
members." In spite of this apparently clear language, the Council has since its 
very first year determined that only a negative vote by a permanent member 
constitutes a veto-that an abstention does not.25 Thus, in theory, a decision of 
the Council could be taken by just nine of the non'permanent members, with 
all the permanent members abstaining. In practice decisions under Chapter 
VII are normally taken by near unanimity, especially of the permanent 
members. The same is true of all decisions that change a sanctions regime, 
whether to make it stiffer or easier, or to suspend or terminate it. The 
consequences of this custom are explored below. 
The p.ractice of the Security Council. The Security Council has imposed 
mandatory economic sanctions infrequently. Each instance differs in at least 
some interesting aspects from the others. They are, in the order of the date of 
initial imposition, as follows: 
• Southern. Rhodesia: 1965 arms and oil embargo and a break in economic 
relations-terminated in 1979 on reaching the agreement, under the auspices 
of the British government, that established Zimbabwe.26 
• South Africa: 1977 arms embargo-terminated in 1994 on assumption of 
power by the new government. 27 
• Iraq, in connection with the invasion of Kuwait: 1990 comprehensive 
economic embargo on exports and imports, especially on export of oil-still in 
force subject to certain exemptions.28 
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• Yugoslavia: (1) 1991 general and complete arms embargo on the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), continued after its dissolution in 
respect of all the successor States-phased termination started in November 
1995; (2) 1992 complete economic embargo (including flights, sporting and 
cultural events) on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and later also 
and especially on the Republika Srbska (the Serb State in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina)-first hardened and later eased, suspended from time to time 
and then finally terminated in 1996.29 
• Somalia: 1992 embargo on all arms deliveries.3o 
• libya, in connection with the investigation of two airplane bombing 
incidents: 1992 arms and air embargo, reduction of diplomatic missions, later 
freezing of funds and embargo on importation of oil equipment.31 
• liberia: 1992 arms embargo.32 
• Haiti: 1993 oil and arms embargo, suspended and reinstated several 
times, and terminated in 1994 on return of the Aristide government.33 
• Angola: 1993 arms and petroleum embargo against UNITA 
faction) and 1997 travel restrictions on high UNIT A 
officials;34 
• Rwanda: 1994 arms embargo-partially suspended in 1995 and 
terminated in respect of the government in 1996, but continued against 
forces;35 
• Sudan: 1996 diplomatic sanctions and later an air embargo;36 and 
• Sierra Leone: 1997 arms and petroleum embargo and ban on travel by 
senior personnel of the government, terminated in 1998 on the 
return of the elected President.3? 
On the basis of these instances, a number of relevant practices of the 
Security Council can be discerned. But first, a more general observation may 
be in order. Except for two minor instances, almost all economic sanctions 
were imposed in the first half of the 1990s. These were the years in which, as a 
result of the sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union and great political 
weakness in China, the Cold War suddenly ended, leaving the international 
diplomatic field at least temporarily to the Western allies and in particular to 
the United States. At the same time the United Nations, freed of the former 
political constraints and buoyed by the successful Namibia operation in 
put into the field an entirely unprecedented number of 
peacekeeping operations-some of which were also supported by sanctions 
regimes. As it turned out, neither the infrastructure of the UN Secretariat nor 
that of the Security Council was really up to this tremendous expansion of 
business.38 Thus peacekeeping operations were launched and economic 
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sanctions imposed without any significant studies of their objectives, means for 
accomplishing them, collateral harms that might result, or exit strategies. By 
the mid,1990s these faults were becoming evident. Even though the Council 
itself seemed reluctant to change its ways (in part because it was constantly 
busy with day,to,day decision,making), other UN organs, particularly the 
General Assembly, have confronted the Council on some of these issues and 
demanded reforms. These proposals too are reflected in the analysis below. 
Decision'making by the Security Council. Decisions concerning sanctions-as 
is true of most decisions during the past decade-are taken by the Security 
Council in private consultation with all Council members, in most instances 
probably preceded by unofficial meetings among some or all of the permanent 
members. Only after a decision has been reached to accept the text of a 
particular draft resolution (whether the decision takes hours or weeks of 
negotiations) is a public meeting held at which the President (who rotates each 
month) announces that agreement has been achieved on a text, which is then 
distributed in public. A formal vote of the Council is then taken. After that 
vote, some or all of the members may make explanatory statements. At the 
same meeting, before or after the vote, nonmembers of the Council (in 
particular the States especially concerned) are invited to make statements. 
They evidently have no influence on the vote, because the decision on the 
draft resolution has already been taken: very rarely is a resolution brought to a 
public meeting and vote that is not assured of adoption, because of either 
insufficient votes or a veto by one or more permanent members. Council 
decisions of lesser import are increasingly taken in the form of presidential 
statements. Also negotiated in private consultations, these are issued only 
when a consensus39 formulation can be agreed onj however, decisions 
imposing, changing, suspending, or terminating sanctions are invariably taken 
in the form of formal resolutions. 
This Council procedure has come under growing criticism by member States 
without a seat on the Council, and complaints are often heard in the General 
Assembly, especially in its Special Committee on the Charter of the United 
Nations and on Strengthening the Work of the Organization. Though the 
Council President of the month now regularly holds briefings after every 
private consultations meeting, calls for increasing transparency and more 
effective participation by nonmembers of the Council continue.40 
Suspension and Termination of Sanctions. The precise conditions relating to 
each sanctions regime are spelled out in the relevant Security Council 
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resolutions, which may be amended from time to time to improve clarity, add or 
remove conditions, or provide for ad hoc or long,term suspensions or ultimately 
for termination. One point that has come under increasing criticism by target 
States and the General Assembly itself is that although sanctions are imposed 
in connection with some target State noncompliance with demands made by 
the Council, the conditions for termination of the sanctions are by no means 
always clear. In particular, in complex situations, in which sometimes dozens of 
Security Council resolutions and an equal number of formal presidential 
statements are made over a period of years (e.g., in respect ofIraq and the Gulf 
War, or in respect of the Former Yugoslavia), with an equal or greater number 
of reactions by the target States, the direct connection (if one ever existed) 
between particular Council demands, State reactions, and sanctions measures 
may be obscured or lost. In such cases the members of the Council, and in 
particular the permanent ones, may disagree as to whether and when the target 
State has met the conditions for the easing, suspending, or terminating of 
sanctions. 
In this connection it should be noted that sanctions resolutions have, with 
very few exceptions, been adopted without any built,in time limits (i.e., 
"sunset" provisions). This contrasts sharply with the practice that has evolved 
in respect of peacekeeping operations, whether of the "Chapter VI and a half'41 
or the Chapter VII variety. These have, since the collapse of the First United 
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF n, always been approved for only relatively 
short periods: normally six months, in a few instances shorter, rarely longer. At 
the end of any such specified period the force is discontinued automatically 
unless agreement can be reached on an extension; a resolution that so provides 
is, of course, subject to veto by any permanent member. 
\Vith respect to several of the long,term sanctions regimes, in particular 
those still covering Iraq and Libya, and formerly the ones relating to 
Yugoslavia, it appears clear that if a resolution to extend them without 
significant change had to be put to the Council, it would fail-sometimes 
because objective conditions have significantly changed, and sometimes 
because of altered political perceptions and alignments of the Council's 
permanent members. However, because sanctions regimes have no sunset 
provisions, those who wish to terminate or modify them bear the burden of 
convincing all permanent members not to veto such a change. It seems likely 
that in the future the Council will not adopt significant sanctions regimes 
without sunset provisions, because certain permanent members, and perhaps 
some nonpermanent ones, will not consent to approving new open,ended 
control regimes. 
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One factor that may contribute to such a change is the gradual recognition 
of the reality that in spite of the Charter obligations of all UN members to 
comply with Security Council,ordered sanctions, when a particular control 
regime gradually loses its legitimacy (either because many States consider 
that the target State has complied sufficiently with reasonable demands of 
the Council, or because the burden caused by the sanctions on either the 
target or on other States [discussed below] is considered excessive), the 
necessary cooperation of States diminishes and gradually disappears. As a 
particular sanctions regime thus visibly crumbles, even its most ardent 
supporters may see the advantage of negotiating a formal termination rather 
than tolerating, perforce, the informal disappearance of the regime, with the 
bad example that may set for continuing respect for other, more important 
ones. 
In 1997 the General Assembly adopted a resolution,42 following extensive 
consideration especially in the Informal Open,Ended Working Group on the 
Agenda for Peace, reflecting a number of major and minor dissatisfactions \\ith 
the practices of the Security Council regarding the imposition of economic 
sanctions. In that resolution, which is not binding on the Council,43 the 
Assembly inter alia recommended that "[t]he Council should define the 
time,frame for sanctions regimes taking [specified] considerations into account" 
and that the "steps required from the target country for the sanctions to be lifted 
should be precisely defined" by the Council.44 
At present, with respect to the open,ended regimes, the burden is effectively 
on those wishing to terminate them to offer proposals acceptable to the 
permanent members that wish to maintain them. Sometimes decisions have 
been taken to suspend these regimes, either for short, renewable terms (which 
permits the proponents of a particular regime to veto each further extension of 
the suspension)45 or indefinitely, in contemplation of an eventual termination 
but still allowing automatic reinstatement if a negative report is received from a 
designated official.46 
Formal Targets of Sanctions. Normally, States are the targets of economic 
sanctions imposed by the Security Council. There are exceptions. For example, 
in imposing sanctions in respect of Angola, the Council targeted not the 
country as a whole but only the UNIT A rebels that continued to fight the 
government in spite of several negotiated and agreed cease,firesY Starting in 
September 1994, the Security Council imposed special sanctions in respect of 
the Republika Srpska,48 the unrecognized Serb State established within Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
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In other instances, the Security Council, having concluded that 
undifferentiated sanctions may only injure the powerless masses (see below), 
has targeted especially governmental elites whose behavior caused the 
international offense for which sanctions were imposed and who may be in a 
position to bring the country into compliance. For example, in employing 
economic sanctions to neutralize a military coup against the elected 
government of Sierra Leone, the Council, inter alia, ordered all States to 
prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of "members of the 
military junta and adult members of their families."49 
Enforcement of Sanctions. Although all UN members are required to comply 
with economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, the enthusiasm of 
these States for carrying out their assigned tasks in any given case is likely to be 
uneven. Some are economically deeply involved with the target State and apt 
to suffer painful economic losses (see below). Others may, on principle or for 
particular political reasons, not be in agreement with the Council as to the 
imposition or the continuation of sanctions. Also, some States may not really 
be in full control of their nationals, who might take advantage of an official 
breach of trade relations in order to smuggle goods at a profitable markup. 
These States may also lack the domestic legal mechanism for banning their 
nationals from forbidden trading and must install it (perhaps through 
parliamentary action) before it can be effective. 
For all these reasons, fully voluntary compliance is apt to be an uneven 
affair, with immediate compliance low but strengthening over time, until 
perhaps international enthusiasm for the sanctions regime flags and 
compliance slips again.50 In imposing sanctions, the Security Council therefore 
normally requests States to report on the legal and practical measures that they 
have taken to comply, and to require their nationals to do so. In most instances 
the Council also establishes a Sanctions Committee (see below), whose 
primary charge is to monitor compliance with sanctions, partly on the basis of 
the reports received from States. These are naturally likely to be somewhat 
self,serving and States in serious noncompliance are apt to fail to submit 
reports at all. The Committee is normally also authorized to receive reports, 
usually from other States, about instances of noncompliance. 
In some instances the Security Council has established formal control 
mechanisms, in particular by authorizing interested States to monitor sea lanes 
leading to the target country.51 When that country also has land borders, and 
especially if transit trade passes through it which the Council is not eager to 
disrupt, monitoring becomes more difficult. This was especially true in respect 
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of the sanctions imposed on the FRY, and even more particularly of those on 
the Republika Srpska, which shares a long border with the FRY. Though 
various attempts were made, the sanctions on Yugoslavia, while not entirely 
ineffective and in many ways painful, were notoriously leaky.52 In its recent 
resolution on sanctions, the General Assembly emphasized the importance of 
compliance by member States and made various recommendations concerning 
their role as well as that of the Council in improving monitoring of and 
compliance with sanctions.53 
At times, the Security Council has authorized a form of blockade designed 
to prevent forbidden cargo from entering or leaving the targeted State.54 
Typically, such measures are easier to maintain along a sea coast than along a 
land border. It should be noted that such a use of military force is generally not 
considered to be an exercise pursuant to Charter Article 42, but rather a means 
of implementing economic sanctions ordered under Article 41 and carried out 
under the aegis of that provision. 
Sanctions Committees. In connection with almost every sanctions regime, the 
Security Council has established a Sanctions Committee as a subsidiary organ 
of the Council. The structures of all these bodies are essentially identical: all 
fifteen members of the Council are represented, which means that each year 
five of the nonpermanent members are replaced. The actual participants are 
lower,ranking members of the respective delegations. In the case of the United 
States and some of the other permanent Council members these 
representatives are specialists in sanctions questions and are supported by an 
appropriate infrastructure {i.e., contacts in the Departments of State, Defense, 
Treasury, Commerce, and probably the intelligence community}, while the 
nonpermanent members are mostly represented by junior,level diplomats 
working part,time on these issues. As a number of such Committees function 
at the same time, the total burden of participation can be heavy. The chairmen 
of these Committees are chosen from among the nonpermanent members and 
serve for at least a year {unlike the monthly rotation of Council Presidents}. 
The Secretariat generally services these Committees in only a formal way {i.e., 
arranging for meetings and for the flow of documentation}, without substantive 
support in terms of economic or other analysis. As the composition of each 
Committee is identical to that of the Council, formal reports are rare (each 
representative presumably keeps his delegation sufficiently informed). This 
arrangement deprives the rest of the UN membership of insight into the work 
and decisions of these important bodies. Accordingly, and although annual 
reports from each Committee to the Security Council are now required,s5 a 
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General Assembly resolution has called for greater transparency in their 
work.56 
The Committees work by consensus, with certain decisions normally taken 
on a no,objection basis. In particular, those decisions authorizing 
humanitarian shipments are circulated to all Committee members. If none 
objects within a given time frame, they are deemed approved; however, any 
representative may put an indefinite hold on any approval, without stating a 
reason. Under the consensus rule such a hold cannot be broken without the 
consent of the objecting representative. 
Each Sanctions Committee receives special assignments in the Council 
resolution establishing it; subsequent resolutions often expand these 
assignments. In general, the tasks are the following: 
• To monitor the implementation of sanctions, by reviewing the 
compliance reports submitted by States and considering information received 
from other States about violations, and by reporting violations to the Councip7 
• To consider applications for exceptions and exemptions provided for by 
the Council, mostly for humanitarian purposes (see below)58 
• To consult, on behalf of the Council, with States alleging special economic 
problems arising out of their compliance with sanctions (see below).59 
In recent years the Council has also required the Committees to promulgate 
guidelines to inform those concerned about the application procedures and the 
circumstances in which these and other types of relief are apt to be granted. A 
General Assembly resolution has called on the Council to make the mandates of 
the Committees more precise, to take account of what can be fulfilled in practical 
terms, and to specify standard approaches to be followed by the Committees.6o 
These Assembly recommendations reflect the fact that over the years 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Sanctions Committees has grown. 
In part, this has been due to their insufficiently precise mandates, to the sheer 
volume of work in dealing with numerous applications, and to a general 
unresponsiveness to apparently legitimate concerns of target States and of 
nontarget States injured by the sanctions regime. The Council itself has 
responded to some of these criticisms by issuing guidelines in the form of a 
series of presidential notes in 1995-1996,61 but the Assembly believes these 
have not solved all problems.62 
Impact of Economic Sanctions on the Designated Targets 
Objectives and Types of Sanctions. The general objective of sanctions is to 
induce compliance by the target State (or other entity) with the Security 
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Council demands for particular actions to be taken or discontinued in order to 
eliminate threats to or breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. 
Some sanctions, in particular arms embargoes, are meant to disable or at 
least to restrict a government or some other target entity from continuing 
effectively the proscribed conduct. The prospects of success depend on the 
extent to which the target authorities are dependent on major and relatively 
sophisticated weapons systems, whose flow can most easily be controlled. 
Embargoes on the import of petroleum and other oil products may also have 
the effect of hindering a war machine heavily dependent on such imports. 
For the most part, however, sanctions are designed to exert general pressures 
on the economy of the target country in the hope that rational considerations 
will cause the government or the ruling elite to yield on the issues of concern to 
the Council so as to relieve the pressures on the economy. Unfortunately, this 
calculation rarely works, for the target States are almost always authoritarian 
(sometimes it is the very authoritarian and illegitimate nature of the government 
that provokes the imposition of sanction), in which the general population may 
suffer, sometimes severely, without being able to induce its government to 
change its course. As discussed below, if the pressures on the general population 
become, or at least are deemed to have become excessive, this may raise legal or 
at least public relations concerns making it difficult for the world community to 
continue that type of pressure. In some instances, resistance to 
economic sanctions comes less from the target State and more from the 
traditional trading partners who wish to resume normal commerce, though they 
may be subtly encouraged to raise their voice by the target State itself. 
In some cases the argument for general economic sanctions may not be 
expressed in such essentially political terms, but rather as an attempt to weaken 
the country so as to make it less able to carry out the mischief that is of concern 
to the Council. 
Because, as will be demonstrated below, general economic sanctions have 
only rarely proven to be effective, and because they may inflict possibly undue 
pain on an essentially impotent population and significantly burden 
neighboring States, other types of sanctions have been tried and are coming 
increasingly into favor. For example, in many of its recent resolutions (e.g., 
those relating to Iraq, Angola, and Sierra Leone), the prohibition is on travel by 
governmental figures, particularly those held especially responsible for the acts 
that provoked the Security Council, as well as by their families, or generally by 
the elite of the country. Though perhaps these restraints may also not prove 
effective, they at least target for discomfort those who bear some responsibility 
for the situation, rather than the arguably innocent and impotent masses. 
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Another type of sanction that has been used from time to time and that has 
in a few instances proven to be surprisingly effective without significant side 
effects have been cultural sanctions, in particular the exclusion of athletes of 
the target country from international sports competitions.63 In respect of South 
Africa and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, these exclusions, evidently 
for psychological reasons, struck peculiarly sensitive nerves, and the rulers of 
these countries were prepared to make significant concessions to terminate 
them. 
The Actual Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions. Reviewing the history of the 
application of economic sanctions and the consequences thereof, the picture, 
based on a few prominent examples, is rather mixed. 
• The government of Southern Rhodesia, which was exposed for well over a 
decade to economic sanctions, in particular as to the import of petroleum 
products, eventually yielded and in negotiations under the auspices of the 
British government agreed to the arrangements that established the State of 
Zimbabwe. Although the long' continued sanctions were probably a factor 
(they were to an extent always neutralized by South Africa, itself a pariah 
State), probably more important was the continuing and increasingly savage 
civil war supported by neighboring States. 
• South Africa was technically subject only to an arms embargo, which 
caused it to build up, albeit at considerable expense, an autonomous arms 
industry. However, though general obligatory economic sanctions were 
blocked in the Security Council by Western vetoes, the General Assembly 
recommended such sanctions to all States. Though not binding on UN 
members, more and more complied. Once the United States did so too 
(because of domestic political concerns), the pressures of the South African 
business community on the government became significant and almost surely 
contributed to the unexpectedly peaceful denouement. 
• Iraq was clearly not deterred by the severe economic sanctions imposed 
immediately after its invasion of Kuwait. Although there were some significant 
arguments before the Coalition air attacks were unleashed some five months 
later, that more time should be allowed for the economic sanctions to work 
(arguments that were countered by pointing to the increasing suffering of the 
Kuwaiti people under the continuing occupation), the very fact that the 
destruction wrought by six weeks of practically unrestrained bombing was also 
insufficient to cause Iraq to leave Kuwait suggests that no severity or extent of 
economic sanctions could have achieved that result. The continuation of the 
practically unrelieved sanctions into the postwar period {including a severe ban 
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on all but humanitarian imports and also on the export of Iraq's one 
commodity, oil-though these have lately been considerably eased) is designed 
to encourage Iraqi cooperation with a number of Council objectives, such as 
the monitoring of arms facilities, the return of Kuwaiti prisoners and captured 
property, and eventually the financing of the UN Claims Commission. 
However, it is not clear that the sanctions have induced Iraq to become in any 
way more cooperative. Rather than complying willingly, it is instead mounting 
a massive propaganda campaign against the continuation of the sanctions 
regime.64 
• The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was subjected to increasingly severe 
economic, cultural, and diplomatic sanctions starting in 1992, for the most part 
because ofits intervention in the Bosnian civil war on the side of the Bosnian Serbs 
(Republika Srpska). These sanctions, though never implemented fully because of 
Yugoslavia's many land borders65 with States that were either somewhat 
sympathetic to the Serb cause or were for political or economic reasons not in a 
position to oppose Yugoslav interests too directly, were effective enough to cripple 
the FRY economy and give rise to an enormous black market conducted by 
associates of the ruling officials. To secure an easing of these sanctions, President 
Milosevic of Serbia agreed in September 1994 to cut off assistance to the Bosnian 
Serbs. As a result, a few economic and cultural sanctions on the FRY (but not the 
Republika Srpska) were suspended for a series of hundred,day periods.66 At the 
conclusion of each the Council examined FRY's behavior before granting a further 
extension.67 After the Dayton Accords all the remaining sanctions were first 
suspended indefinitely,68 and then terminated on the basis of compliance reports 
from those implementing the agreements.69 It can thus be said that these sanctions 
had at least been moderately effective.7o 
• The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and after its dissolution all of its 
successor States were subjected to a complete arms embargo from 199171 until 
1996.72 That embargo, though never particularly effective (especially against 
the Serbs, who inherited most of the enormous arms stocks of the SFRY) 
because of the many land borders the successor States had with sympathetic 
States, succeeded in somewhat reducing the flow of heavy and modern 
armaments into Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they would have threatened 
UN and other international forces. In particular, the Bosnian Muslims 
complained that the embargo unfairly prevented them from exercising their 
inherent right of self,defence, a complaint that found a sympathetic ear in the 
United States, which at least passively abetted a flow of arms to themP 
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Altogether, there is no unambiguous answer to the question of the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions, except to say that if they work at all they 
appear to require application. 
Critics have pointed out that one reason for both the frequent 
ineffectiveness of economic sanctions and for our uncertainty about their 
operations is that the United Nations has not been in a position, in considering 
the imposition of sanctions, to make any detailed projections as to their likely 
effect, and during their actual application to secure any but anecdotal evidence 
about their actual effectiveness and their impact on the target State. Thus, 
whether or not economic sanctions could actually be effective if applied 
scientifically, this has never actually been done. At most, the Organization has 
relied on studies prepared by the governmental services of some of the 
permanent members, studies which were not shared with the United Nations 
itself but which presumably motivated the decisions proposed by their 
representatives in the Security Council and Sanctions Committees. 
It might be pointed out that part of the difficulty in dealing objectively and 
scientifically with this subject is a terminological one. The "effectiveness" of 
sanctions can refer to any of three distinct calculations: (1) the extent to which 
States actually comply with the Security Council directives to cut off the flow 
of commerce or finances to and from the target State; (2) the extent to which 
such a cut in the international flow of resources actually impacts on the 
economy of the target State; (3) the extent to which the target State actually 
modifies its behavior as a result of the impacts on its economy. 
Legal Constraints on Economic Sanctions. The economic 
sanctions on the FRY and especially those on Iraq have raised the specter of 
undue harm to the most vulnerable members of the target society: children and 
the women who care for them, the elderly, and the sick. It is true that these 
sanctions regimes, as adopted by the Security Council, invariably exempted the 
supply of food and medicines for humanitarian purposes and that the 
respective Sanctions Committees were given broad powers to grant effective 
relief. Against this, the target States and their sympathizers claim that the 
Sanctions Committees, as they actually operate, are far too prone to allow 
indefinite and unexplained holds on proposed humanitarian shipments. In 
addition, it is claimed that because the foreign assets of target States are frozen 
and their exports blocked, these States are not in a position to purchase even 
the humanitarian supplies that they would be permitted to import. 
Naturally, the proponents of sanctions deny the allegations of undue 
harshness in the implementation of sanctions regimes; they countercharge that 
473 
The Law of Economic Sanctions 
the target States generally appear to have sufficient hidden assets to finance 
the import of luxury goods for their elites and even extensive armament 
programs, that their governments often distribute available humanitarian 
supplies unfairly, and that extensive black markets are allowed to flourish for 
the benefit of those close to the government. 
From a legal point of view it is undoubtedly true that even the United 
Nations and the Security Council, and of course all States, are bound by 
universally applicable humanitarian principles that forbid the starvation of 
civilian populations74 and that call for special care to be taken to protect 
vulnerable persons.75 To give precision to these concepts, the General 
Assembly has called for further attention to the concept of the "humanitarian 
limits of sanctions" and proposed that "standard approaches should be 
elaborated by the relevant United Nations bodies." At the same time, the 
Assembly has made a number of pertinent operational recommendations.76 
Impact of Economic Sanctions on Third States77 
It was recognized already in the Covenant of the League of Nations that a 
universal obligation to impose economic sanctions on might 
require mutual support in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience 
resulting from such economic measures.78 The UN Charter preserved this rule 
in Article 49. It also added Article 50, which, although going somewhat 
further, ultimately contents itself with granting States "confronted with special 
economic problems arising from the carrying out of [preventive or 
enforcement] measures" only "the right to the Security Council with 
regard to the solution of these problems." 
When this Article was being formulated at the San Francisco Conference, 
several initiatives for strengthening it were turned down. These included a 
South African proposal that a State suffering economic damage from sanctions 
not directed against it should be able to charge the target State, through the 
Security Council, to pay compensationj79 another was a Venezuelan proposal 
that if approached by a State that had suffered damage, the Council would be 
obliged to take corrective measures.80 From the text adopted, it appears clear 
that the State concerned has no "right" except to consult the Council. 
Incidentally, what pertains to economic difficulties arising directly from a 
State's application of sanctions, applies even more strongly to those that merely 
suffer from the general economic distortions resulting from the sanctions 
regime. 
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The question then arises what steps the Security Council could take to 
relieve a complainant State. Though not specified in Article 50, it appears from 
Article 48(1) that the Council could excuse a State from participating in the 
imposition of the sanctions. In the World Court's advisory opinion in the 
Certain E:I.-Penses case it is suggested that the Council- could provide for the 
United Nations to pay compensation to such a State, the costs of which would 
then be assessed on all members as expenses of the Organization.81 
In practice, from the very first time that the Security Council imposed broad 
economic sanctions; i.e., those on Southern Rhodesia, neighboring States that 
were especially affected have sought to resort to Article 50. Indeed, this has 
been the case in respect of all such broad sanctions-but of course not in those 
instances when the embargo was merely on the sale of arms or on 
communications, or on cultural or diplomatic intercourse. The Council, in 
tum, has generally referred these States to the respective Sanctions 
Committee, charging these with giving the complainant States a hearing but 
not authorizing the Committees to grant any specific relief. 
In no instance has a Sanctions Committee recommended the exemption 
under 48 (1) of a complainant State from the obligation to participate in 
the sanctions regime.B2 Further, in no instance has consideration been given to 
compensating directly such a State from the UN budget. Instead, the 
Committees, or the Council on their recommendation, have issued general 
appeals to the international community, that is to other States and competent 
IOOs or organs, to assist particular States or the affected States in general. 
Though has been some response to th\'!se appeals and assistance has been 
provided to the most severely affected States, in general the relief provided has 
been in no degree commensurate with the damage caused or at least claimed.83 
The result has been tnat the burden of sanctions has remained distributed most 
unevenly among member States, generally with the target's neighbors or its 
traditional trading partners affected much more severely than others, 
especially the permanent members of the Security Council.84 
For some years affected States have been taking their complaints to the 
Oeneral Assembly, which has launched several studies and considerations on 
this subject.8s Some of the Assembly's latest recommendations are set out in its 
above,mentioned resolution on sanctions, which in this respect merely 
recommends that the Assembly itself and other relevant organs "should 
intensify their efforts to address the special economic problems of third 
countries affected by sanctions regimes" and that the subject be studied more 
intensely in the near future.86 Other recommendations, also calling mostly for 
further studies, appear in the 1997 resolution on "Implementation of the 
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Provisions of the Charter of the United Nations Relating to Assistance to 
Third States Affected by the Application of Sanctions."s7 The 
Secretary,General had already suggested in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace that 
the Security Council devise a set of measures involving financial institutions 
and the UN system "to insulate States from such difficulties."as 
Conclusions 
Unlike "sanctions" imposed by individual States or groups of States, the 
legality of which have become ever more suspect over the past decades and 
particularly in recent years, the legal foundations of economic sanctions 
imposed by the Security Council under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the 
Charter are solidly founded in international law. However, this does not mean 
they are not problematic. 
One difficulty, of what initially may appear to be primarily a practical nature, 
is that in the past almost no collective efforts (as distinguished from those of 
individual members, in particular the permanent members of the Security 
Council) have been made to establish on the basis of thorough economic and 
political studies what sanctions can sensibly be applied to a target State, what 
their likely impact would be on the target and on other States, how well 
sanctions are actually implemented, and what their actual effects are over time. 
Thus, this potentially devastating economic weapon is being used without 
proper guidance or control. In particular, it is difficult to tell, because of the 
dearth of significant information on most sanctions regimes, whether their 
impact is proportionate to the benefit sought. Evidently, the possible infliction 
of major harm that mayor may not conform to the general rule of 
proportionality is problematic from a legal point of view. 
Secondly, it is necessary to address the essentially legal issue of the 
"humanitarian limits of sanctions," i.e., whether some economic sanctions may 
not be applied or continued indefinitely if their impact on vulnerable 
populations is excessive. While it seems clear that in principle there must be 
some limits, the difficulty is in deciding whether in a given case the ostensible 
effects of the sanctions imposed are indeed excessive, and if so whether the 
cause for that excess lies in the rules establishing the regime in question, in the 
implementation of that regime by the competent Sanctions Committee, or 
perhaps in the authorities of the target State, which may deliberately distribute 
the resources available to it in such a way as to put even legitimate sanctions in 
an unfavorable light. 
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Finally, the problem recognized in Article 50 of the UN Charter, that is the 
collateral damage that a sanctions regime may impose on innocent third 
parties, has so far not been satisfactorily or systematically addressed. The 
hardship caused by these regimes is thus most arbitrarily and unevenly 
distributed, sometimes burdening the weakest and often uninvolved States 
rather than those more responsible for their imposition and better able to bear 
the burden. 
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